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Tortious Interference with Business Relations:
"The Other White Meat" of Employment Law
Alex B. Longt
INTRODUCTION
When an attorney representing the interests of an employer receives a copy of a newly-filed complaint, she almost invariably can expect to find buried among the allegations of
wrongful conduct an assertion of some collateral tort. In addition to the typical claims of discrimination, wrongful discharge,
or breach of contract, a defense attorney can usually count on
contending with a tort that is secondary to the plaintiffs main
complaint with her employer. For example, in addition to
claiming that a discharge was wrongful, a plaintiff will commonly allege that the employer's conduct was also extreme and
outrageous.1 To defense attorneys, such claims are an example
of what they perceive as the shotgun approach to litigation em-2
ployed by plaintiffs in the hopes of hitting the liability jackpot.
For plaintiffs' attorneys, such claims are a necessary tool to fill
statutes in orthe gaps left by the various anti-discrimination
3
der to make their client whole.
Such collateral torts are most frequently used as a garnishment to a discrimination, wrongful discharge or breach of
contract claim-the main courses of the complaint. Although
an employee may, for example, have serious and valid concerns
that her employer has acted outrageously toward her or det Lecturer, West Virginia University School of Law.
1. See Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and
Employment At Will: The Case Against "Tortification"of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 390 (1994); see also Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful TerminationLitigation, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1693, 1693 (1996) (discussing plaintiffs' use of collateral
torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion
of privacy, and fraud in wrongful termination litigation).
2. See Gergen, supra note 1, at 1693.
3. See id. at 1694 (defending the use of collateral torts in wrongful termination litigation).

864

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:863

famed her in some fashion while, at the same time, discriminating against her, it is the charge of discrimination that is the
heart of a discrimination claim. Occasionally, however, the
collateral torts take center stage. When, for example, an employer supplies a negative reference to a prospective employer,
the collateral tort of defamation is the logical cause of action to
assert.4 In this sense, in addition to being a garnish for a
wrongful discharge claim, collateral torts are sometimes the
white meat of employment law, serving as the chief cause of action where a wrongful discharge claim could not succeed.
In the world of the labor and employment lawyer, red meat
claims are those that deal directly with the existence of the
employer-employee relationship. Often, the main focus of a
particular case will be in determining the nature of the relationship itself, i.e., whether an employment at-will situation
exists or whether there exists some form of contractual limitation upon the employer's ability to discharge the employee.
Thus, breach of contract claims can be characterized as red
meat claims. More often, however, the focus will be on the employer's treatment of the employee during the existence of, or at
the end of, the relationship. Thus, wrongful termination, constructive discharge, and discrimination claims may also be
categorized as red meat claims.
In addition to the typical white meat claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress or defamation, one old and illdefined tort has undergone something of a resurgence in recent
years. Traditionally covered only at the end of the first-year
torts class, if at all, tortious interference with contractual relations or business relations has become a chic and newly emboldened cause of action in recent years. 5 Numerous commentators have noted the rise in the number of tortious
interference claims, often focusing their attention on the confu6
sion caused by the proliferation of such claims.
4. See, e.g., Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Employer
(Ir)rationalityand the Demise of Employment References, 30 Am. BUS. L.J.
123, 123-24 (1992) (discussing the reluctance of employers to supply references
concerning employees for fear of defamation suits).
5. Although the two torts constitute separate causes of action, this Article often refers to the two torts collectively as "interference" claims for the
sake of convenience.
6. See Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1098
(1993); Gary D. Wexler, Comment, Intentional Interference with Contract:
Market Efficiency and Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CONN. L. REV.
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The basic concept of interference claims is simple. In the
paradigm interference case, one party knowingly and without
justification somehow interferes with the existing contractual
relationship between two other parties. 7 Interference causes of
action, however, seek to protect not only existing contractual
relationships, but also prospective contractual and business
relationships.8 Not surprisingly, therefore, most of the attention paid to the tort to date has focused primarily in the area of
commercial law. 9
Employment law has not, however, been immune to the
expansion of the tort of interference, and such claims have now
gained a solid foothold in labor and employment law. Given the
tort's pedigree, this foothold is hardly surprising. The first
modern case to recognize the cause of action, Lumley v. Gye,' 0
involved one employer suing another over the latter's attempt
to lure away an employee under contract." Similar cases ininto leaving the
volving employers' attempts to entice servants
2
employ of their masters soon followed.'
What is perhaps most interesting about the rise of interference claims in the employment context is the manner in
which such claims are now being asserted. In the typical red
meat employment claim, the plaintiffs primary target is her
employer. Perhaps the employer has terminated the employee
in violation of the terms of her employment contract, or in violation of some substantial public policy, or because of her race
or gender. Regardless, the typical red meat suit is usually a
suit against the party who officially ended the employment relationship. A number of recent interference cases suggest,
however, that many plaintiffs now are using interference
claims to sue a party other than the party who is ultimately re-

279, 280 (1994).
7.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).

8. See id. §§ 766B-766C.
9. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 222-25 (1987); Mark P. Gergen, Tortious
Interference: How It Is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This Is Not Entirely
Bad, and a PrudentialResponse, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175 (1996); Marina Lao,
Tortious Interference and the FederalAntitrust Law of Vertical Restraint, 83

IOWA L. REV. 35 (1997); Myers, supra note 6.
10. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
11. See id. at 750.
12. See Gergen, supra note 9, at 1201-05 (discussing early interference
cases in the employment setting).
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sponsible for their plight. 13 As such, tortious interference is
quickly emerging as one of the more potent white meat forms of
liability.
A recent case from West Virginia provides a good example.
In Tiernan v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.,14 Betty
Tiernan was terminated by her former employer, Charleston
Area Medical Center. 15 Shortly after losing her job, Tiernan
began working as a union organizer and eventually accepted a
new position with a geriatric nursing home. 16 For reasons
which are unclear from the opinion, the medical center shortly
thereafter contacted Tiernan's new employer and notified it of
Tiernan's union activities.17 Apparently none too pleased,
Tiernan's new employer summarily discharged her. 18 Therefore, while Tiernan may have had gripes with both the medical
center and the nursing home, the party most directly responsible for her being out of job was the nursing home-the party
that fired her. Theoretically, Tiernan might have had a strong
case based upon federal law against her new employer. Discrimination based upon one's union activities is prohibited by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 19 and the new employer's discharge of Tiernan almost certainly constituted
prima facie discrimination. 20 Instead, Tiernan chose to sue her
old employer, the medical center, for its alleged tortious interference with her business relationship with her new em2
ployer. '
As this Article illustrates, Tiernan is not an aberration.
Tortious interference claims can be an effective tool for recovery in the employment setting, both as an additional cause of
13. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 14-21.
14. 506 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1998).
15. See id. at 581.
16. See id. at 581-82.
17. See id. There was a dispute at the trial court level as to the exact nature of the relationship between the medical center and the nursing home. See
id. at 592. There was, for example, evidence that the medical center actually
controlled the nursing home, thus possibly explaining its notification of the
geriatric home as to the nurse's union activities. See id.
18. See id. at 582.
19.

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).

20. See Tiernan, 506 S.E.2d at 593 n.26. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals itself noted that "it seems quite clear from the facts of this
case that a prima facie action existed for violation of [29 U.S.C. § 158] prohibiting discrimination resulting from union activity." Id.
21. See id. at 582. Tiernan also sued the medical center for its initial
termination of her employment. See id.
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action and where an action against the party who is ultimately
responsible for the harm might not be possible. Recognizing
the potential weapon that interference claims present, employees who feel they have been wronged are increasingly turning
to this cause of action, either in conjunction with a wrongful
discharge claim or where such a claim against the discharging
party would be frustrated. As such, interference claims will
continue to find their way into the diet of labor and employment attorneys.
Most of the literature to date has focused on the uncertain
nature of the interference claim and the lack of a clear doctrinal foundation to support it. 22 Although any discussion of
tortious interference claims must address that issue, this Article focuses on the practical implications of the tort in the most
practical of settings-the workplace. Part I discusses the nature of the tort and the uncertain premises that underlie it. As
discussed, the same uncertainties that pervade the tort in
commercial settings apply with equal force in employment law.
Indeed, the vagaries of interference law work in conjunction
with some of the more opaque areas of employment law to
make the claim a particularly effective weapon in the plaintiffs
arsenal. Part II examines how interference claims have taken
hold in the workplace and how they have emerged as a viable
alternative to traditional claims of wrongful discharge. This
Part also explores the confusion that underlies the decisions in
cases involving interference claims. Part III discusses how the
tort may also serve as an alternative to one of the more common white meat claims-defamation stemming from a negative
employment reference. Here, the tort's uncertain foundations
have created a different type of confusion, causing courts to
grapple with whether a damaging, but truthful, communication
may serve as the basis for liability. As will be discussed,
whether a plaintiff is serving red meat or white meat, courts
and employers will continue to have difficulty digesting the interference meal.
I. THE LAW OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
A. ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM

Traditionally covered only at the end of first-year torts
classes, if at all, tortious interference claims have become a chic
22. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 6, at 1109-10.
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cause of action in recent years. Nearly all jurisdictions recognize one if not both types of interference claims: tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with business
relations (also referred to as interference with prospective
business advantage or contractual relations).
The most common approach to the interference torts derives from the Restatement (Second) of Torts [hereinafter Second Restatement]. Section 766 of the Second Restatement defines the tort of interference with contract as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a
third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to
perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to
perform the contract.3

As worded, the burden would appear to be on the plaintiff to establish that the interference was improper as part of her prima
facie case. However, the authors chose to hedge on this issue
by stating that a plaintiff is "well advised" to plead that the interference is improper, but noting that the matter may also be
24
held to be one of defense.
Under the approach followed by some courts, the plaintiff
need not show that the interference was in any way improper
as part of her prima facie case. Instead, the plaintiff merely
must show that the interference was intentional and that it
caused a breach of the contract.2 5 Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate an
affirmative defense, typically phrased as either "justification"
or "privilege. 2 6 Importantly, legitimate competition is not rec27
ognized as a defense to a claim of interference with contract.
The elements of the tort of interference with business relations are essentially the same, except that with the tort of interference with business relations, an existing contract is not a
prerequisite to the cause of action.2 8 Instead, a mere "prospec29
tive contractual relation" or business expectancy is sufficient.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
note 6,
28.
1988).

§ 766 (1977).
Id. § 767 cmt. b.
See, e.g., Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102-03 (Va. 1985).
Id. at 103.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(2) (1977); Myers, supra
at 1112.
See, e.g., Postell-Russell v. Inmont Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Mich.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977).
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Again, under the more modern Second Restatement approach,
the burden would appear to be on the plaintiff to show that the
interference was improper:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the
benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into
or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation. 30

Other courts typically require that the plaintiff prove only:
"(1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business
expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on
the part of the interferor; (3) intentional interference inducing
or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship
or expectancy has been disrupted."31 Once a prima facie case is
established, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate
justification or privilege for the interference. 32 Some examples
of a "justified" or "privileged" interference include the cases of
legitimate competition between the plaintiff and the interferor,
where the interferor has responsibility for another's welfare,
and where the interferor intends to influence another's business polices in which the interferor has an interest. 33 Unlike
with the tort of interference with contractual relations, legitias a defense to a claim of intermate competition is recognized 34
relations.
business
with
ference
Both approaches have garnered their share of criticism.
The main criticism of the second approach is that it "requires
too little of the plaintiff," because "[tihe major issue in the controversy-justification for the defendant's conduct-is left to be
resolved on the affirmative defense of privilege."35 In contrast,
30. Id.
31. Chaves, 335 S.E.2d at 102; see also Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med.
Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 591-92 (W. Va. 1998) (applying essentially the same
test).
32. See Chaves, 335 S.E.2d at 103.
33. See, e.g., Tiernan, 506 S.E.2d at 592. The terms "privilege" or "justification" are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Chaves, 335 S.E.2d at 103;
Tiernan, 506 S.E.2d at 592-93.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(2) (1977); Myers, supra
note 6, at 1112.
35. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 303 (Utah 1982);
see also Myers, supra note 6, at 1112 (stating that the better approach is to
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courts that have adopted the approach of the Second Restatement typically place on the plaintiff the burden of showing that
the interference was improper or unjustified. 36 Under this approach, the plaintiff bears the "very significant burden" of
37
proving that the defendant's interference was improper.
Section 767 of the Second Restatement lists the factors to
consider in assessing whether a defendant's interference with a
contract or a prospective contractual relation is improper:
(a)the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e)the societal interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
Cf the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.3"

Although the authors of the Second Restatement chose to frame
the issue as a consideration of the propriety of an action, courts
often use the concepts of privilege or justification interchangeably with "not improper" for purposes of assessing a defendant's conduct. 39 Because few defendants will admit that
they lacked justification or that their interference was improper, it seems safe to conclude that the issues will almost always be at play, regardless of whether they are part of the
plaintiffs prima facie case or surface in an affirmative defense.
B. THE UNCERTAIN NATURE OF THE TORT
Given the increased attention paid to interference claims,
one might expect that both a clearer approach to the handling
of interference and a unifying theme explaining the principles
underlying the tort might have emerged. Regrettably, this has
to confuse
not been the case. The tort of interference continues
40
and confound commentators and courts alike.
put the burden of demonstrating impropriety on the plaintiff).
36. See, e.g., Kingv. Sioux City Radiological Group, 985 F. Supp. 869, 88182 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (applying Iowa law).
37. Leigh Furniture,657 P.2d at 303.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977).
39. E.g., Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 245 (Wyo.
1991) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (referring to justification, privilege, and "not
improper" as "all being the same concept").
40. See Leigh Furniture,657 P.2d at 303 ("In short, there is no generally
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Part of the problem comes from the very nature of the tort.
As its name implies, tortious interference with contract involves both tort and contract principles. In order to determine
whether liability exists for interference with contract, one must
first determine whether a contract exists and whether it has
actually been breached. 4 1 At least one court has noted that the
elements of the tort are a "curious blend" of the principles of liability for intentional torts, whereby the plaintiff proves a
prima facie case of liability, subject to any affirmative defenses,
and negligent torts, in which the plaintiff proves liability based
on the interplay of various factors. 42 However, interference
claims implicate more than contract and tort principles. As one
student commentator has stated, interference claims "appeari
at the intersection of tort law, property law, contract law, and
antitrust law."43 Dan Dobbs has criticized the tort, arguing
that the protection the tort affords existing contracts gives the
contract the "quality of property-it becomes good against the
world."44 The notion that the tort is essentially property-based
in nature is found repeatedly in courts' discussions. 4 5 This confusing blend of competing bodies46of law contributes to the uncertainty that surrounds the tort.

acknowledged or satisfactory majority position on the definition of the elements of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations."); Myers, supra note 6, at 1099 ("[T]ortious interference law suffers from
considerable doctrinal confusion."); Wexler, supra note 6, at 281-82 (criticizing
the tort's impact on, inter alia, market efficiency and fundamental constitutional rights). But see Gergen, supra note 9, at 1179 (arguing that the tort "is
grounded... on the striking proposition that tort law ought to be open for the
redress of any injury, and in particular any intentionally inflicted injury").
41. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Covenant Coal
Corp., 977 F.2d 895, 899 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Virginia's interference law).
42. Leigh Furniture,657 P.2d at 302 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1977)).
43. Wexler, supra note 6, at 282.
44. Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with ContractualRelationships,
34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 351 (1980).
45. See, e.g., Garrison v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem'1 Hosp. Ass'n, 438
S.E.2d 6, 14 (W. Va. 1993).
46. An example of this confusion can be seen in how courts classify an interference claim for purposes of the applicable statute of limitations. Compare
id. (holding that a two-year statute of limitation governing actions for damage
to property applies to an action for tortious interference with business relations), with Wilkerson v. Carlo, 300 N.W.2d 658, 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that an action alleging interference with economic relations is governed by a three-year statute of limitations for injuries to persons or property).
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Another recurring criticism is that tortious interference
claims have an adverse effect upon competition and efficiency. 47
As mentioned, legitimate competition is not a defense to a
claim of interference with an existing contract. 48 Although a
competition privilege for interference with business relations
exists, its effectiveness is lessened somewhat by the Second Restatement's motive-based inquiry into the propriety of the interference.4 9 Section 768 of the Second Restatement provides that
an interference is not improper if the interferor's purpose "is at
least in part to advance his interest in competing with the
other."50 In addition, the comments to section 767 note that, if
the desire to interfere with the other's contractual relations
was the sole motive behind the interference, "the interference is
almost certain to be held improper."5 1 Therefore, if a competitor is motivated solely by a desire to harm his competitor, the
interference will be almost per se improper. This focus on the
defendant's motive gives interference claims a highly speculative and uncertain quality. Such motivation is a question of
fact, not easily resolved on summary judgment or on a motion
52
to dismiss.
In addition, the Second Restatement itself provides little
guidance as to how strong a role a defendant's illegitimate motive must play in order to make his or her interference improper. According to the Second Restatement, the desire to interfere need not be the sole or even the primary motive in order
for an interference to be improper. 53 Even if the desire to interfere is only a "casual motive it may still be significant in some
circumstances." 54 The trier of fact, therefore, is left with little
47. See Myers, supra note 6, at 1100; Wexler, supra note 6, at 317.
48. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
49. See Myers, supra note 6, at 1100.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(d) (1977).
51. Id. § 767(b) cmt. d; see also id. § 768 cmt. g (noting that if the "conduct
is directed solely to the satisfaction of his spite or ill will and not at all to the
advancement of his competitive interests over the person harmed, his interference is held to be improper").
52. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Selles, 784 P.2d 433, 436 (Or. 1989) (en banc) (denying a motion to dismiss where plaintiff claimed that the competitor's interference was motivated by malice and ill will); see also Holly M. Poglase, Handling the Intentional Interference with Employment Contract Case, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Nov. 1995, at 8, 8 ("Since the intent of the alleged interfering third

party is many times the linchpin of the case, it is often difficult to obtain
summary judgment.").
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1977).
54. Id.
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guidance on how to weigh the actor's motive against the other
amorphous factors contained in section 767 in order to arrive at
a conclusion.
It is perhaps this lack of certainty over the significance of
the actor's motive that has generated the most criticism and
confusion. 55 Ultimately, most interference claims will depend
on the resolution of the question as to the propriety of the defendant's actions. The Second Restatement's seven-factor test
56
for making this determination is imprecise to say the least.
Of course, the same criticism could be directed toward most
torts (for example, negligence); however, impropriety is an inherently trickier concept, because much of its focus is on the
motive of the defendant or the means used to accomplish the
interference. Compounding the problem is the Second Restatement's suggestion that, in order to determine whether an
interference is improper, courts balance such vague concepts as
"the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes" and "the societal interests in protecting the freedom of
''57
action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other.
The motive-based approach to determining impropriety
almost guarantees that most cases, even those with merely a
hint or suggestion of an improper purpose, will wind up in front
of a jury.58 The Second Restatement's hodgepodge of factors
undoubtedly becomes a blur to most jurors, who can hardly be

55. In his exhaustive study of interference law, Gary Myers quite accurately catalogs some of the criticisms in this regard:
The central drawback of interference with contract relates to its
focus on the element of improper purpose or wrongful intent. Several
commentators argue that the wrongful intent element is too flexible.
For example, Prosser and Keeton note that actual spite or malice is
not required, "leaving a rather broad and undefined tort in which no
specific conduct is proscribed and in which liability turns on the purpose for which the defendant acts, with the indistinct notion that the
purposes must be considered improper in some undefined way."
Myers, supra note 6, at 1109-10 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 979 (5th ed. 1984)). See generally id. at 1133 (discussing the ambiguities inherent in the motive inquiry and

the problems they bring about); Benjamin L. Fine, Comment, An Analysis of
the Formation of PropertyRights Underlying Tortious Interference with Contracts and Other Economic Relations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1116, 1116-17 n.9
(1983) (discussing the uncertainty in the area of the proper scope of defense of
privilege or justification); Wexler, supra note 6, at 295 ("Every case turns out
to be essentially an ad hoc determination.").
56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(c) & (e) (1977).
58. See Myers, supra note 6, at 1133.
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blamed for deciding interference cases on a "gut level" or on
some generalized notion of right or wrong.5 9 It is this lack of
clear guidance that is perhaps the tort's greatest shortcoming.
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
RED MEAT CLAIMS: WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Interference claims may come in many forms and from
many directions in the workplace. An employee may sue a coworker for making an "either she goes or I go" threat to the
employer; 60 an employee may assert an interference claim if his
employer interferes with the employee's contracts with his
subagents by campaigning to have the subagents cancel their
contracts and sign up with the employer; 6 1 an employee may
sue an employer for enforcing a non-competition clause;6 2 or a
discharged employee may decide to sue his former employer
when the employer's misrepresentations to the state's unemployment compensation office delay payment of unemployment
compensation.6 3 Although these examples provide an indication as to the flexibility of the interference torts in the workplace, it is in the area of wrongful discharge law that interference claims maintain their greatest strength.
Of all the collateral torts that are frequently asserted in
the employment setting, none bears as close a relationship to a
wrongful discharge claim as tortious interference with contractual relations or interference with business relations. An employer may act outrageously in the manner in which he fires an
employee. In the aftermath of a discharge, he might also defame the employer or invade her privacy by publicizing the reasons for the discharge. 4 However, these acts are only inciden59. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 55, § 129 at 979 (referring to
interference as a "rather broad and undefined tort in which no specific conduct
is proscribed and in which liability turns on the purpose for which the defendant acts, with the indistinct notion that the purposes must be considered improper in some undefined way").
60. See Cowan v. Steiner, 689 So. 2d 516, 518 (La. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on
othergrounds, 701 So. 2d 140 (La. 1997).
61. See Benny M. Estes & Assocs. v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 1228, 1228
(8th Cir. 1992).
62. See Empiregas, Inc. v. Hardy, 487 So. 2d 244, 244 (Ala. 1985).
63. See Ellett v. Giant Food, Inc., 505 A.2d 888, 888 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1986).
64. See, e.g., Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Wis.
1989) (involving an employee's lawsuit for defamation and invasion of privacy
resulting from the employer's distribution of copies of a company newsletter
listing as the reason for an employee's termination "(flalsification of
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tal to the actual act of discharge. The act of tortiously interfering with an employee's employment relationship, like the act
of discharging an employee, often has the direct result of ending that relationship. Therefore, tortious interference is perhaps the most logical and natural companion to a wrongful discharge claim. Indeed, one court has even gone so far as to state
that "the most useful way to view an action for wrongful discharge is as a particularized instance of a more inclusive tort65 of
intentional interference with the performance of a contract."
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that tortious interference
claims are frequently asserted either in conjunction with a
claim of wrongful discharge or as an alternative thereto.6 6 In
addition to the close fit that naturally exists between wrongful
discharge claims and tortious interference claims, the same uncertainties that exist with interference claims in other areas of
the law apply with equal, or perhaps greater, force in the employment setting. The subjective quality of the tort helps to
make it a particularly attractive collateral tort for plaintiffs. In
addition, the fact that an employment relationship is at-will is
usually not a bar to a claim of interference with business relations. Thus, a host of reasons exist which make interference
claims particularly attractive for plaintiffs.
A. THE UNCERTAIN "IMPROPRIETY" STANDARD AND OTHER
FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR THE USE OF INTERFERENCE CLAIMS
IN THE EMPLOYMENT SETTING

Assuming that a defendant has, in fact, somehow interfered with an employee's relationship with her employer, the
ultimate issue to be resolved in most cases is whether the defendant acted improperly. As noted, this is a highly uncertain
standard, not easily susceptible to resolution on a motion for
summary judgment. Given the fact that many employment
relationships end with a fair amount of ill will on both sides, it
is relatively easy for an employee who feels she has been
wronged to allege with a straight face that the adverse employment action was motivated by an improper purpose. Here,
the vague nature of the Second Restatement's test for deter[e]mp[loyment] forms"). Some courts have held that an employer's statement
that an employee was discharged "for cause," by itself, can be defamatory. See
Vanover v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 438 N.W.2d 524, 527 (N.D. 1989); Carney v. Memorial Hosp. & Nursing Home, 475 N.E.2d 451, 453 (N.Y. 1985).
65. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 618 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
66. See Gergen, supra note 9, at 1196.
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mining whether an interference is improper is of potential
value to employees.
When jurors are left to deal with imprecise concepts such
as impropriety, results may vary wildly. Courts, for example,
may be willing to rule as a matter of law that certain conduct is
not sufficiently hostile or pervasive so as to form the basis of a
hostile environment claim in violation of Title VII. 67 In contrast, courts consistently have held that, no matter how the tort
of interference is expressed, whether as conduct without justification, without privilege, or merely improper, the question is
usually one of fact for the jury.68 This tendency to leave the
resolution of questions as to the defendant's mental state to jurors is, of course, not specific to the field of employment law;
however, because the tort of interference fits so nicely with existing theories of recovery that are common to employment law,
the tort has particular application in this arena.
If the employee alleges that the defendant acted solely out
of malice, this will usually be sufficient to raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the defendant's actions were
privileged. Moreover, unlike the case of the various antidiscrimination statutes, an employee is not limited to arguing
that she was discharged because of the employer's consideration of race, gender, etc. 69 A simple desire on the part of the defendant to injure the employee may be sufficient, regardless of
any consideration of a protected characteristic. 70 This may give
an interference claim a distinct advantage over the typical discrimination suit. Given the choice between proving that an
employer discriminated on the basis of race and proving that
the employer acted out of personal hostility and ill will, a plaintiffs attorney would undoubtedly choose the latter.7 ' Further,
as the question of impropriety is usually one for the jury, interference claims are less likely to be resolved on a motion for
summary judgment than are discrimination claims, for which a
substantial body of law with at least some concrete guidelines
67. See, e.g., Saxton v. AT&T Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that two isolated instances of unwanted sexual advances by a supervisor
were insufficient to create a hostile work environment).
68. See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop.-Mo. Basin Power Project v. Howton,
603 P.2d 402, 405 (Wyo. 1979).
69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (prohibiting discrimination "on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
70. See RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 767(b) cmt. d (1977).
71. Of course there might be other reasons to prefer a discrimination
claim, not the least of which is the possibility of recovering attorney's fees.
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has developed. 72 Another distinct advantage of interference
claims in the employment setting is the fact that, under the
majority approach, the existence of an employment contract is
not a prerequisite to recovery. 73 One of the more common arguments advanced by employees attempting to escape the restrictions of at-will employment 74 is that an employee handbook
created a contractual limitation on the employer's ability to discharge the employee. 75 As the law in this area has developed,
employers have attained frequent success in defeating such potential claims through the use of clear and obvious disclaimers
disavowing any limitation on their right to discharge employees
for any reason. 76 Thus, implied contract claims based upon
employee handbooks are often of limited utility.
Interference claims, however, may eliminate the need to
resort to the contract-based claims. If no contract exists, interference with an at-will relationship is usually sufficient to provide the basis for a claim of interference with business relations; if a contract for employment is terminable at will, the
Second Restatement provides that the contract is nonetheless a
valid and subsisting contract for purposes of an interference
with contract claim. 77 Moreover, the fact that interference with
72. See Poglase, supra note 52, at 8 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining
summary judgment).
73. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
an at-will employee may state a viable cause of action); Zappa v. Seiver, 706
P.2d 440, 442 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that a terminable at-will contract
is actionable); Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton, 463 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla.
1985) (stating that a prima facie case of tortious interference does not require
evidence of an enforceable contract); Kemper v. Worcester, 435 N.E.2d 827,
830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that interference with a terminable at-will
contract is actionable because the contract is a subsisting relation, is of value
to the plaintiff, and is presumed to continue in effect); Stanfield v. National
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 588 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
a contract terminable at-will may be the subject of a cause of action for tortious interference when the interference is alleged to have occurred while the
contract was in existence); Mansour v. Abrams, 502 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (App.
Div. 1986) (stating that a terminable at-will contract is actionable); Tiernan v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 591 n.20 (W. Va. 1998)
(holding that the "tort of interference with a business relationship does not
require that the relationship be evidenced by an enforceable contract").
74. See infra text accompanying note 79 (describing the employment atwill concept).
75. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258,
modified 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
76. See, e.g., Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265, 269 (D.C.
1993).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977). According
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contract sounds in tort, rather than contract, provides another
advantage over a typical breach of employment contract claim,
namely, the possibility of tort-based damages, including punitives. An executive whose employment contract has been
breached may be limited to recovery of the benefit of the bargain if he or she brings a breach of contract claim. In contrast,
if that same executive is able to fit his or her claim within the
interference-with-contract paradigm, he or she may be able to
recover emotional distress damages, damages for loss of reputa78
tion, and punitive damages.
B. INTERFERENCE CLAIMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
DISCRIMINATION AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY CLAIMS

One of the clearest examples of the utility of interference
claims is in the realm of anti-discrimination statutes. Here, interference claims provide a means of escaping the restrictions
of the employment at-will rule as well as some of the drawbacks of anti-discrimination laws. Under the employment atwill doctrine, an employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.79 If a discharged at-will
employee is unable to prove that he or she was fired because of
his or her race or gender or another protected characteristic,
the employee might turn to one of the more uncertain judicially
created public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine. Under
the public policy exceptions, discharges that are inconsistent
with some clearly defined public policy are unlawful.80 If, for
example, an employer discharges an employee for refusing to
take a polygraph test8 l or for engaging in jury service,8 2 the

to the Second Restatement, the fact that the contract is terminable at-will is to
be taken into account when assessing damages. See id.
78. See Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (discussing the standard for punitive damages); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (1977) (discussing the availability of damages for
emotional distress or actual harm to reputation). See generally Wexler, supra
note 6, at 321 ("[T]he attractiveness to a plaintiff of the interference torts over
a mere breach of contract action is intuitive.").
79. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 671-72 (2d ed.
1999).
80. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1225
(Alaska 1992).
81. See, e.g., Pearson v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 820 P.2d 443, 445
(Okla. 1991).
82. See, e.g., Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tenn. 1992).
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employee may be able to obtain relief by arguing for the use of
a public policy exception.
Interference claims may provide an alternative for employees who are unable to fit their claims under either an antidiscrimination statute or a public policy exception. Under the
majority approach, the fact that an employment relationship is
at-will is sufficient to allow the employee to proceed under a
theory of tortious interference with business relations.8 3 Therefore, for those employees who toil without the benefits and burdens of an employment contract, tortious interference with
will treat
business relations provides a means whereby a court 84
the at-will relationship as something akin to property.
Under the Second Restatement approach, an interference
may be improper if effectuated out of malice.8 5 Therefore, the
discharge need not offend an anti-discrimination law or some
public policy in order to provide a means for relief, provided
that the interference leading to the discharge was still somehow "improper." Although an interference motivated by discriminatory animus might well be improper, such motivation is
not a prerequisite to an interference claim. 86 Thus, for example, when a company manager allegedly concocts false and defamatory accusations against an employee, but there is no evidence that the manager's scheme was motivated by
discriminatory animus, a tortious interference claim is a viable
option.8 7 Indeed, because one of the factors to be considered in
assessing impropriety is the nature of the defendant's conduct,
88
the defendant's motivation may sometimes be irrelevant.
Thus, the Second Restatement's vague impropriety standard
may help some employees, insofar as they do not have to prove
that a discharge was, in fact, motivated by consideration of

83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. However, prospective
relationships do not receive the same level of protection as do existing contractual relations. See supra text accompanying note 48.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767B cmt. d (1977).
86. See Nelson v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254, 260 (D.Del. 1996).
87. See Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. COA99-162, 2000 WL
108504, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2000) (involving this fact pattern and reversing a grant of summary judgment against the manager).
88. See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah
1982) (stating that a defendant may be held liable for an intentional interference arising from an improper purpose or by an improper means);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(a) (1977).
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some protected trait or in contravention of a specific public
policy.
An interference claim may also provide a procedural advantage over a statutory discrimination claim.
Antidiscrimination statutes, while providing a means of recovery for
many plaintiffs, carry with them some potential drawbacks.
Complicated and elaborate remedial schemes, jurisdictional
thresholds, and the possibility that a defendant may remove
the case to the often-more-hostile environment of the federal
89
court system are all potential pitfalls for the unwary plaintiff.
These drawbacks may make a common law theory the more attractive or, in some cases, the only viable theory of recovery.
In light of the above, it is not uncommon for plaintiffs to
assert an interference claim in conjunction with, or in place of,
a statutory discrimination claim.9 0 An interference claim may
also serve as a viable alternative where a plaintiff is not able to
fit her claim within one of the narrowly defined public policy
exceptions to the common law employment at-will rule.9 1 Although the offending conduct may not provide a means of escaping the rule that an employee may be discharged for any
reason, it may nonetheless still be "improper," thereby forming
89. See Ruth Colker, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 99, 102 (1999) (chronicling the high success rate of ADA defendants in federal court and attributing this success to,
inter alia, the establishment of "an impossibly high threshold of proof for defeating summary judgment" by courts).
90. See, e.g., Nelson, 949 F. Supp. at 255 (dismissing plaintiffs' discrimination claims on a 12(b)(6) motion but allowing an interference claim against
the supervisor); Plessinger v. Castleman & Haskell, 838 F. Supp. 448, 451-52
(N.D. Cal. 1993) (upholding on a summary judgment motion an associate's interference claim against the firm's client based on age discrimination); Alam v.
Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 909-13 (D. Nev. 1993) (involving both
unsuccessful interference and discrimination claims); Agugliaro v. Brooks
Bros., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 956, 963-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (involving claims of discrimination and interference); Postell-Russell v. Inmont Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1,
1 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (involving claims of discrimination and interference);
Vuksta v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
affd 707 F.2d 1405 (3d Cir. 1983) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs claims of discrimination and malicious interference); Grahek v. Voluntary Hosp. Coop. Ass'n., 473 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Iowa 1991) (dismissing an age
discrimination claim, but allowing an interference claim to proceed).
91. See Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoads, Inc., 565
A.2d 285, 289-92 (D.C. 1989) (stating that an employee had no claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, but allowing the jury verdict to
stand in favor of plaintiff on her interference claim); Eib v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that plaintiffs claim
was not for wrongful discharge, but for interference).
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the basis of an intentional interference claim.9 2 For example,
in Melley v. Gillette Corp.,93 the plaintiff alleged that he was
wrongfully terminated because of his age.9 4 Bypassing the
state's anti-discrimination legislative scheme, the plaintiff
claimed that such a discharge amounted to a discharge in violation of public policy.9 5 The trial court refused to allow the suit
to proceed, stating that to create a new common law cause of
action in such a case would interfere with the comprehensive
remedial scheme established by the legislature.9 6 Importantly,
however, the court noted that where a plaintiff complains of an
existing common law wrong, such as tortious interference, the
remedial statute will not bar recovery.9 7 Obviously, there is
nothing particularly surprising about the outcome of the case
or this particular statement of the law; however, the case does
serve to remind plaintiffs that they may, if the facts allow, look
to the already established interference causes of action, rather
than attempting to create new exceptions to the employment
at-will doctrine.
A clear example of this principle is the case of Grahek v.
Voluntary Hospital Cooperative Ass'n. 98 In Grahek, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the state's civil rights commission,
alleging that he had been discharged because of his age.9 9 The
commission dismissed the complaint because it had not been
filed within the applicable statute of limitations. 0 0 Having
been stymied in his attempt to pursue his statutory remedy,
the plaintiff brought suit in state court against his former employer and others alleging, inter alia, wrongful termination and
intentional interference with contractual relations.' 0 '
The
lower court dismissed his claims, stating essentially that they

92. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1025
(Ariz. 1985) (vacating the lower court's decision that plaintiffs only viable
cause of action was for intentional interference with an employment relationship where the employee may have been fired for a reason contrary to public
policy).
93. 475 N.E.2d 1227 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985), affd 491 N.E.2d 252, 253
(Mass. 1986).
94. See id. at 1228.

95. See id.
96. See id. at 1229.

97. See id.
98.
99.
100.
101.

473 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Iowa 1991).
See id. at 33.
See id.
See id.

882

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:863

were simply the same time-barred age discrimination claim
dressed up in common law clothes and were barred by the exclusivity provision of the state anti-discrimination statute. 102
While agreeing with the trial court with respect to the
plaintiffs wrongful termination claim, the appellate court disagreed with respect to his interference claim. 0 3 The antidiscrimination statute at issue made it unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of age.' °4 Because the plaintiff
alleged that he had been wrongfully terminated because of his
age, his wrongful termination claim was indistinguishable from
his earlier civil rights claim. 0 5 With regard to the interference
claim, the court recognized, however, that the tort of interference cannot be committed by a party to a contract.10 6 The court
stated that it was unclear from the complaint whether the defendant was actually a party to the contract that had been
breached as a result of the defendant's actions. 0 7 If the defendant was actually a third party to the contract, then its actions
were not covered by the statute, and the plaintiffs common law
claim could not be preempted by a statute directed only toward
the actions of employers. 0 8 As such, summary judgment
against the plaintiff was improper. 0 9
The fact-specific nature of the improper-purpose analysis
also helps make interference claims an attractive alternative to
statutory discrimination claims for plaintiffs. In Nelson v. Fleet
0 two female former bank
NationalBank,11
employees sued their
former supervisor for, inter alia, violations of Title VII, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference."' The court dismissed the plaintiffs' Title VII claims,
citing the fact that the supervisor could not be individually liable under Title VII. 112 The court likewise dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the exclusivity provision of the state's Workers' Compensation Act

102.

See id.

103. See id. at 36.
104.

See id. at 33-34.

105.
106.
107.
108.

See
See
See
See

109.

See id.

id. at 34-35.
id. at 35.
id.
id. at 35-36.

110. 949 F. Supp. 254 (D. Del. 1996).
111. See id. at 258-60.
112. See id. at 258-59.
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barred recovery.1 13 However, the tortious interference claim
survived the supervisor's motion to dismiss, despite the fact
that the employment relationship was at-will, because there
existed a factual question as to whether the supervisor's actions, allegedly motivated by racial and gender hatred, were
14
within the scope of his employment.'
In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to the balancing test of section 767 of the Second Restatement to determine if
the supervisor's actions as alleged were improper. 115 In the
court's words, the factors listed in section 767 could be summarized "by simply asking 'whether pursuit of self-interest justified one in inducing another to breach a contract in the particular circumstances.""' 16 As the plaintiffs' complaint contained
numerous allegations with racial and gender-based overtones,
the court concluded that a reasonable inference could be drawn
that the supervisor had acted for reasons apart from legitimate
business concerns and, as such, his interference with the plain7
tiffs' employment relationship could have been improper. 1
C. INTERFERENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE

One of the theories with which an interference claim serves
as a logical companion is constructive discharge. As it is usually defined, a constructive discharge claim occurs where the
defendant has created a working environment so intolerable
that a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would feel
compelled to quit. 118 Like the tort of interference with contractual relations, the defendant in a constructive discharge case
has engaged in some form of improper conduct so substantial
that it interferes with the plaintiffs ability or willingness to
carry on in his or her job. Although the majority rule is that
the defendant need not actually be motivated by a desire to
bring about the discharge in order for the plaintiff to state a
prima facie case of constructive discharge," 9 proof of such a
113. See id. at 259.
114. See id. at 260-61.
115.

See id.

116. Id. at 260 (quoting Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532
A.2d 983, 992 (Del. Ch. 1987)).
117. See id. at 260-61.
118. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir.
1986).
119. Compare id. (stating the majority rule), with Martin v. Cavalier Hotel

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:863

motive may be relevant in both constructive discharge cases
and interference cases. As such, the two theories have substantial overlap.
One factor that distinguishes the two theories is the requirement in a constructive discharge case that the conduct
must somehow be attributable to the employer.120 The improper behavior of a co-worker may be sufficient to hold the
employer liable. In order to succeed, however, a plaintiff must
prove that the employer knew or should have known about the
behavior in question and failed to respond. 121 If the plaintiff is
unable to make the requisite showing of employer liability, the
claim of tortious interference looms as a possible alternative
against the offending employee. Because all that is required
for this claim to succeed is an intentional and improper interference by an individual not a party to the contract or employment relationship, the tort of interference may provide a means
of recovery against the person most directly responsible for the
122
plaintiffs decision to quit.
For example, in Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 123 a coworker's relentless harassment of a female employee following
a romantic relationship gone sour ultimately resulted in the
female employee's resignation. 124 The female employee's former boyfriend was merely a co-worker, not her actual employer. 125 Because there was no evidence that the employer
had any knowledge of the co-worker's behavior, a constructive
discharge claim would have been unavailing. 126 Instead, the
Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1350 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating the minority rule that an
employer's actions must be committed with the intent to force the employee to
quit).
120. See Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 786 F.2d 1537, 1542-43 (11th
Cir. 1986).
121. See id.
122. See Cashman v. Shinn, 441 N.E.2d 940, 944 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (involving a suit brought against a director of a corporation for actions which
forced the plaintiff to resign); Eserhut v. Heister, 762 P.2d 6, 8 (Wash. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that co-employees may be liable for intentionally interfering
with an employment relationship in a case in which co-employees ostracized
the plaintiff to the point where he resigned).
123. 733 P.2d 430 (Or. 1987).
124. See id. at 431-32.
125. See id. at 435.
126. See id. at 435-36 (stating that the owner of the business did not know,
nor should he have known of the defendant's conduct). The exact working relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant-employee is somewhat unclear from the opinion; however, nothing in the facts suggests that the defendant employee had any supervisory control over the plaintiff.
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plaintiff successfully alleged that the co-worker had intentionally interfered with her economic relationship through conduct
that ultimately forced her to resign. 127 Because the interference of the co-worker forced the plaintiff to abandon her employment relationship with the company, the plaintiff was able
to recover where, under a constructive discharge theory, recovery would have been barred.

D. THIRD-PARTY PROBLEMS
The above cases illustrate some of the possibilities that tortious interference claims provide to plaintiffs. However, the
cases do not, in and of themselves, resolve the question of
whether the use of interference claims under such circumstances is actually proper. Although in many cases a plaintiffs
true complaint is with a co-worker or superior, rather than the
employer, establishing a consistent framework of analysis for
interference claims against individual employees has proven
difficult. Nowhere within employment law have tortious interference claims given the courts more difficulty than in the area
of individual employee liability.
Supervisor, Officer, and Director Liability
It is fundamental to an interference claim that the defendant may not be a party to the contract or business relationship. 128 In other words, there must be three parties involved
for a successful interference claim: the two parties to the relationship and a third party who interferes with that relationship. Thus, if a corporate employer discriminates against an
employee by paying her less than other employees of a different
race, there can be no interference claim because the corporate
employer is a party to the relationship, and no thirdparty has
interfered with the employee's relationship with the employer. 129 Taking this logic a step further, it can be argued that
where an agent has the authority to fire an employee on behalf
of the corporate employer, the actions of the agent are, from a
legal standpoint, those of the employer. As a corporation can1.

127. See id. at 434.
128. See, e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977) (defining the tort of interference with contractual relations as involving a defendant who interferes with a
contract between another and a third person).
129. See, e.g., Postell-Russell v. Inmont Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Mich.
1988).
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not act except through its agents, any authorized act performed
by an agent is that of the corporation.
Logically, it would seem to follow that an individual, acting
under the express or implied authority of the corporate employer, cannot be liable for any act that interferes with the relationship between the plaintiff-employee and the employer.
As one court has stated: "It would be anomalous indeed to hold
an agent liable for tort committed within the scope of his
authority, when liability does not attach to the principal for the
same tort committed on his behalf and presumably for his benefit." 30o However, as numerous cases attest, courts have not
13 1
been of one mind on this issue.
Part of the confusion stems from the changing nature of
the workplace itself. As the nation's economy has developed,
the sole proprietorship has largely been replaced by the corporate entity, which brings with it varying levels of bureaucracy.
As one court has stated, "[flormerly there was a clear delineation between employers, who frequently were owners of their
own businesses, and employees. The employer in the old sense
has been replaced by a superior in the corporate hierarchy who
132
is himself an employee. We are a nation of employees."
Thus, it is often difficult on both a conceptual and a practical
level to distinguish between the acts of a corporation and the
acts of individual supervisors and officers.
Another source of the confusion is the interplay between
agency principles and the Second Restatement's balancing-offactors approach to determining the impropriety of an interfer130. Hicks v. Haight, 11 N.Y.S.2d 912, 917 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
131. See Girsberger v. Kresz, 633 N.E.2d 781, 791 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (upholding a judgment against an officer of employer who sought discharge in bad
faith); Hunter v. Board of Trustees of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510,
518 (Iowa 1992) (upholding a jury verdict against the director of a medical
center); Stack v. Marcum, 382 N.W.2d 743, 760 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of the supervisor); Eib v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing a grant of
summary judgment in favor of corporate officers who caused plaintiffs termination); Cappiello v. Ragen Precision Indus., Inc., 471 A.2d 432, 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (holding a supervisor and president who terminated
plaintiff liable for malicious interference). See generally Trimble v. City and
County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 726-27 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (holding coemployee liable for maliciously interfering with plaintiffs relationship with
employer); Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoads Inc., 565
A.2d 285, 290-91 (D.C. 1989) (holding individual supervisor liable under an
interference theory for recommending plaintiffs termination where supervisor
lacked authority to terminate and acted in bad faith).
132. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980).
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ence. One of the fundamental principles of tort law is that an
employer may be liable for an employee's torts committed
within the scope of employment. "Scope of employment" is perhaps an even more malleable and ill-defined term than "impropriety," the key concept of tortious interference. As a general
rule:
A servant is acting within the course of his employment when he is
engaged in doing for his master, either the act consciously and specifically directed or any act which can fairly and reasonably be
deemed to be an ordinary and natural incident or attribute of that act
or a natural and logical result of it.'33

Therefore, if a supervisor has the authority to hire and fire, his
act of discharging an employee on behalf of the employer is
within the scope of his employment. Because his actions are
also those of the corporate employer, there is a strong argument that he is not a third party and should not be individually
134
liable under an interference claim.
An act is not within the scope of employment, however, if it
is done with no intention of serving the principal. 135 Thus, if a
supervisor charged with the authority to hire and fire acts
purely out of malice toward a plaintiff in discharging him or
her, the act is not within the scope of employment. 136 In such a
case, there is a strong argument that because the supervisor is
not acting on behalf of the corporate employer, he may be a
third party to the relationship and could be held liable.
This focus on the mental state of an agent in determining
whether his or her actions are within the scope of employment
bears a close resemblance to the Second Restatement's balancing-of-factors approach to determining impropriety. Both questions are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury. 137 Under the
133. Cochran v. Michaels, 157 S.E. 173, 175 (W. Va. 1931).
The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 provides:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only
if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.
134. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996); Fletcher v.
Wesley Med. Ctr., 585 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (D. Kan. 1984).
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1958).
136. See id. cmt. a, illus. 2.
137. See, e.g., Nelson v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254, 263 (D. Del.
1996) (stating that the question of whether an action is within the scope is or-
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Second Restatement's impropriety test, a court may consider
both the actor's motive and the interests sought to be advanced
by the actor in assessing whether the actor's behavior was justified.138 If the actor's motive was solely to injure the plaintiff,
the interference is almost certain to be improper. 139 Although
the question of justification or propriety is distinct from the
question of a party's status with regard to a relationship, some
courts, relying on the Second Restatement, tend to view the
questions as interchangeable. 140 The result is a grab bag of decisions providing no clear guidance as to the question of individual employee liability.
In many cases, a discharged employee might be tempted to
assert an interference claim against the individual who actually did the firing. The courts take several different approaches
to this situation. For some, the question of whether the defendant is a third party is as simple as asking whether that individual had the authority to fire the plaintiff.141 As stated, a
corporate employer can only act through its agents and must
delegate certain decisions to its supervisory employees in order
to function. For these courts, "[i]f a corporation's officer or
agent acting pursuant to his company duties terminates or
causes to be terminated an employee, the actions are those of
the corporation; the employee's dispute is with the company
employer for breach of contract, not the agent individually for a
tort."142

In keeping with this approach, the Second Circuit, in Finley v. Giacobbe, held that an individual with undisputed
authority to hire and fire the plaintiff could not be individually
liable for interfering with the plaintiffs employment relationdinarily a question for the jury); Sorrells v. Garfinkel's, Brooks Bros., Miller &
Rhoads Inc., 565 A.2d 285, 292 (D.C. 1989) (stating that whether a privilege
has been abused is a question of fact for the jury); Basin Elec. Power Coop.Mo. Basin Power Project v. Howton, 603 P.2d 402, 405 (Wyo. 1979) (stating
that questions concerning the propriety of a defendant's actions are ordinarily
for the jury).
138.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977).

139. See id. cmt. d.
140. See infra notes 167-72.
141. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
New York law); Fletcher v. Wesley Med. Ctr., 585 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (D.
Kan. 1984) (applying Kansas law); West v. Troelstrup, 367 So. 2d 253, 255
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979).
142. Ulrich v. City of Crosby, 848 F. Supp. 861, 872 (D. Minn. 1994) (quoting Nording v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 505 (Minn. 1991)).
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ship when he fired the plaintiff.143 Under the Second Circuit's
approach, in order to show that an individual employee is a
third party, a plaintiff must show that the employee exceeded
the bounds of his or her authority. 144 As the defendantemployee in Finley had direct supervisory authority over the
plaintiff, including the power to fire, the defendant-employee
bounds of his authority and, hence, could not
acted within the145
party.
be a third
Under this approach, the question is one of status, rather
than of privilege, and the fact that a defendant-employee may
have acted with malice is irrelevant to the status of the actor.
In Fletcher v. Wesley Medical Center, the plaintiff claimed that
the defendant-employee had acted out of personal motives in
146
firing the plaintiff, allegedly because of the plaintiffs age.
The district court concluded that it was "quite immaterial" that
the defendant-employee may have acted with personal purposes in firing the plaintiff because, in firing the plaintiff, the
defendant-employee was simply acting within the scope of her
147
duties as head of the department in which plaintiff worked.
The court noted that an employer cannot be liable for interfering with its own relations with its employees. 148 Therefore, "it
just [did] not make sense" to view the defendant-employee's act
149
of firing the plaintiff as other than the act of the employer.
As such, while age-based animus on the part of the defendantemployee might be attributable to the employer, the defendantemployee was not legally capable of interfering50with the relationship between the principal and the plaintiff.1
A second approach to the individual liability situation recognizes the distinction between status and privilege but takes
into account the actor's motive in determining his or her
status.15 1 In Press v. Howard University,152 the District of Co143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

79 F.3d at 1295.
See id.
See id.
585 F. Supp. at 1261.
Id. at 1262.
See id.
Id.

150. See id.

151. See, e.g., Kassman v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (holding that privilege is vitiated when a defendant acts "within the
ambit of employment" but out of malice); Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495
So. 2d 1381, 1388 (Ala. 1986) (holding that an agent who acts on behalf of a
principal and not for his own interests is not a third party to a relationship);
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lumbia Court of Appeals held that a former faculty member of a
university could not sue several university officials under an
interference theory because the officials, as officers of the university, were in fact acting as the alter ego of the university.1 53
A year later, the court explained its Press holding in a similar
case involving a defendant-supervisory employee. 54 In Sorrells
v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Brothers, Miller & Rhoads, Inc.,155 the
court noted that, although the fact that the officials in Press
were officers rather than mere supervisors was important to its
decision, more significant was that there was no allegation that
156
they had acted maliciously.
In Sorrells, the supervisor, while recommending that the
plaintiff be terminated, lacked the actual authority to terminate. 157 Just as important, the supervisor was alleged to have
acted with malice in bringing about the termination. 158 Thus,
according to the court, the individual supervisor was not truly
acting as an alter ego of the employer.
While it makes sense to shield from liability officers who act without
malice, and within the scope of their authority, as in Press, the same
cannot be said for a supervisor... who was not authorized to terminate the contract between [the employer and the employee], and
whom the jurors found to have acted with malice.'59

Hence, the supervisor was forced to fall back on what the court
described as a supervisor's "qualified privilege to act properly
and justifiably toward a fellow employee and that employee's
true employers." 160 When a supervisor acts with malice for the
purpose of causing the employee to be discharged, the court
held, the qualified privilege is lost. 16 1
Wright v. Shriner's Hosp. for Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Mass.
1992) ("As Wright's supervisor, Russo had a right to fire Wright unless he did
so 'malevolently, i.e., for a spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimate corporate interest.'" (citation omitted)); Stack v. Marcum, 382 N.W.2d
743, 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a supervisor may be individually
liable under an interference theory for discharging an employee when the supervisor acts on his own behalf, rather than the employer's).
152. 540 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1988).
153. See id. at 736.
154. See Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoads, Inc., 565
A.2d 285, 290 (D.C. 1989).
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.

159. Id. at 290-91.
160. Id. at 291.
161. See id.
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Other courts tend to view the distinction between agent
and employer less formally and are more likely to permit the
plaintiff to proceed under an interference theory. For example,
in Trimble v. City and County of Denver,162 the plaintiff charged
the defendant-employee with malicious interference with the
plaintiffs employment relationship. 163 The defendant-employee
argued that, as an agent of the principal, he was not a third
person to the contract. 164 The Supreme Court of Colorado disagreed, giving short shrift to the defendant-employee's third
party argument. The court based its conclusion in part on the
fact that an employer may sue an employee for tortious interference with contractual relations between the employer and
other persons. 165 The implication is that because the law recognizes a distinction between principal and agent in some
situations, an agent may be considered a third party for the
sake of an interference claim. The fact that a defendant is an
employee of one of the contracting parties is "simply one factor,
one, in determining whether that person
albeit an important
' 166
acted 'improperly."
The final approach appears to be unconcerned with any
distinction between status and privilege. For these courts, the
question of status simply merges into the broad concept of
privilege, justification, or impropriety. Courts following this
approach tend to view the question of whether an individual
defendant was acting pursuant to his or her authority as one
pertaining to privilege, rather than pertaining to whether that
individual was a third person to the employment relationship. 167 In Eib v. Federal Reserve Bank, 16 8 two corporate offi-

162.
163.
164.
165.

697 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
See id. at 724.
See id. at 726.
See id.

166. Id. at 725.
167. See DuSesoi v. United Ref. Co., 540 F. Supp. 1260, 1275 (W.D. Pa.
1982) (referring to the privilege of officers and directors of a corporation to
take actions which have the effect of interfering with a contractual relations
between the corporation and third parties, but recognizing that a corporation
may only act through its agents); Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 626 N.E.2d 862,
869 (Mass. 1994) (referring to the question of whether an individual defendant
acted within the scope of employment as a question of justification); Eib v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 633 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (referring to a
corporate officer's privilege to dismiss plaintiff); Barker v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., No. COA99-162, 2000 WL 108504, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2000)
(stating that "non-outsiders," such as managers, often enjoy qualified immunity for inducing their corporation to breach an employment contract, if their
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cers argued that they were not third parties to the relationship
between the corporation and the employer because, as officers,
their actions were those of the corporation. 69 Hence, they argued, they could not be individually liable for causing the plaintiff to be discharged. 7 0 Rejecting the defendants' argument,
the court simply glossed over the third-party argument.' 71
Rather than losing their third-party status if they acted for
personal reasons or in bad faith, the officers, according to the
court, had lbst their privilege to dismiss the plaintiff without
72
incurring liability. 1
In many cases, the end result is likely to be the same no
matter which approach a court takes. Under the Second Restatement, an agent's motive is taken into account both in determining whether the agent acted within the scope of employment and whether such actions were improper. 73 If an
agent acts solely to promote his own interest, his action will be
both outside the scope of employment and improper. 7 4 Yet, the
situation may sometimes be more complicated. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides that an agent may still act
within the scope of employment, even if the predominant motive of the servant is to benefit himself. 7 5 Therefore, if personal motives influenced a defendant-employee to discharge a
plaintiff, but, at the same time, he was also acting in part to
advance the employer's interests, the defendant-employee
would still be acting within the scope of employment and, arguably, should not be liable for any interference. 76 However,
motive is to protect the corporation's interests); Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n., 489 A.2d 1364, 1370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating that
whether an individual employee could be liable for interference for acting beyond the scope of his authority is a question of fact over privilege).
168. 633 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
169. See id. at 436.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172.

See id.

173. See supra notes 38, 133 and accompanying text.
174. See Gergen, supra note 9, at 1197 n.116. Gergen states:
This reasoning produces roughly the same result as a test of impropriety in suits against agents because the standard for separating an
agent from his principal-the question is posed as whether he acted
outside his authority or against the interests of his principal-is
similar to the standard defining when an agent's action is improper.
Id.
175.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236 cmt. b (1958).

176. See, e.g., Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 620 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980).
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under the Restatement (Second) of Torts' balancing-of-factors
approach to impropriety, a personal motive need not predominate in order to render the interference improper.177 Thus, it is
theoretically possible that an individual is arguably not a third
party to a relationship, but, under the test for impropriety,
could be liable for improper interference if he is deemed a third
person. 7 8 This is yet another example of how the interplay between competing tort principles may spawn recurring uncertainty in interference law.
For employers and their agents, the problem is more than
merely a question of form over substance. In those jurisdictions in which supervisors, officers, and directors may be individually liable even when acting pursuant to their authority,
tortious interference claims represent a substantial inroad in
the employment at-will rule. If employment at-will means anything, it means that an employee can be fired for any reason,
even a personal one, so long as it is not an illegal one.1 79 The
notion of individual liability for interference claims provides
employees one means of escaping the sometimes harsh effect of
that rule. Although a corporate employer may technically be
the discharging party, at some point in the decision-making
process, someone within the corporation has to make the decision to discharge an employee. Depending upon the approach
taken by a particular court, that someone may be held liable
under an interference theory, even though that someone is
acting pursuant to his or her authority and is motivated by
something other than discriminatory animus or an attempt to
circumvent public policy. Thus, although the corporate employer itself may emerge unscathed in such a case, interference
claims may provide an effective end run around the employment at-will doctrine by making the decision-maker liable.

177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1977); see also
supra text accompanying note 53.
178. Although this outcome is theoretically possible, there are few, if any,
reported opinions involving this scenario. Most courts hold that an interference is improper, unprivileged, or unjustified if the personal motives of the defendant were the sole motive or the predominant motive. See Halvorsen v.
Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 388-90 (Ct. App. 1998)
(summarizing the different approaches of courts).
179. See supra text accompanying note 79.
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2. More Third Party Problems: Employers' Vicarious Liability
for the Interference of Their Employees
Of course, in most instances, a corporation is a more attractive potential plaintiff than is an individual, primarily because the corporation is likely to have more money. Another
potentially alarming concern for a corporate employer is the
possibility that it might be held vicariously liable for the interference by one of its employees with its own relationship with
another employee. Again, the simple notion that a party may
not tortiously interfere with a relationship to which it is a party
would seem, at first glance, to be dispositive. Holding employers vicariously liable for an agent's improper interference with
the employer's contractual relationship with another employee
is, in the words of one court, "conceptually incoherent." 180
However, several decisions have at least raised the specter of
establishing liability against an employer for interfering with
its own contract through the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Under respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for
all torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment.' 8 ' It seems almost inconceivable that the doctrine
could apply to tortious interference claims, which, by definition,
exclude the case of a party to a relationship interfering with its
own contract. Yet, drawing an analogy with wrongful discharge law, one court has stated:
It is arguable that whether there was a third person should not be
dispositive. If one were to adopt the view that a corporate employer
may be held vicariously liable when one of its employees improperly
discharges another employee, it would seem that so could the employer be held vicariously liable when one of its employees intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual
relation with the employer.'82

The Pennsylvania Superior Court found in that case that the
defendant-employees had intentionally and improperly interfered with another employee's relation with the defendant-

180. Mailhiot v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1987); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 248 cmt. c
(1958) ("A master is not liable in tort for the act of a servant who improperly
causes the master to break a contract with third persons or with one of his
own servants.").
181. See, e.g., Griffith v. George Transfer & Rigging, Inc., 201 S.E.2d 281,
287 (W. Va. 1973).
182. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 624 n.13 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980) (citations omitted).
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employer. 83 The court knew of "no reason to prevent" the employer's vicarious liability for the interference of its employees.184

In Massachusetts, a plaintiff advanced a similar policybased
argument to no avail. In Clement v. Re-Lyn Contracting
Co., 8 5 a discharged plaintiff argued that, by not holding employers vicariously liable for the interference of their employees
with contracts to which the employer is a party, courts essentially have created a distinction inconsistent with other
branches of employment law. 8 6 For example, liability may be
imposed on an employer whose supervisor terminates an at-will
employee in violation of clearly established public policy.
Therefore, the argument went, vicarious liability should be imposed under an interference theory when a supervisor acting
within the scope of employment, but for an improper purpose,
discharges an at-will employee. 8 7 "To permit the existing dis183. See id. at 625.
184. Id. In fact, there are several very good reasons to prevent the imposition of such liability. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (citing the
Restatement (Second)ofAgency's position on the subject).
At least one other court, in an indirect fashion, has upheld a compensatory damage award against an employer for malicious interference with its
own contract with an employee. In Cappiello v. Ragen Precision Industries
Inc., 471 A.2d 432 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), a plaintiff sued his corporate employer as well as its president and the plaintiffs supervisor under several theories, including malicious interference. See id. at 434. On the defendant's appeal of an adverse jury verdict, the court upheld liability against the
corporation under a theory of vicarious liability for the acts of the agents. See
id. at 437. It is unclear from the court's confused and confusing opinion, however, under what theory the court sustained the verdict: "breach of contract,
abusive discharge of an employee at will, malicious interference with the employee's contract rights or some combination of those theories." Id. at 434.
But see Borecki v. Eastern Int'l Management Corp., 694 F. Supp. 47, 58
(D.N.J. 1988) (stating that the Cappiello court "rested its affirmance not on a
theory of wrongful termination, but on plaintiffs allegation of malicious interference with contractual rights").
At least one other court has allowed an employee to proceed under an interference theory against the employee's corporate employer, based upon an
allegedly improper interference by the employee's supervisor. See Bernstein v.
Aetna Life & Cas., 843 F.2d 359, 367 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Arizona law).
Other courts have suggested the possible viability of vicarious liability. See
Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21, 24 n.3 (Mass. 1981) ("[Ihf [the
individual defendants], acting within the scope of their employment, engaged
in bad faith and unfair conduct, their actions might properly be charged to
[the employer].").
185. 663 N.E.2d 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
186. See id. at 1236.
187. See id.
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tinction," the plaintiff argued, "is merely to select violations of
public policy as more deserving of protection from malicious
acts of supervisory employees-a choice that cannot rationally
188
be defended."
Although such arguments have a superficially logical appeal, they are better directed toward the abolishment of the
employment at-will doctrine as a whole, rather than an expansion of tortious interference law. The adoption of a rule
whereby an employer could be held vicariously liable for an
"improper" termination-but one that was not based on discriminatory animus or in contravention of public policy-would
effectively eviscerate the employment at-will rule. Under the
at-will doctrine, a discharge is not actionable even if "'the discharge by the employer was malicious or done for other improper reasons." 189 Yet, by imposing vicarious liability in the
interference context, such a discharge is virtually indistinguishable from a wrongful discharge. Indeed, it is arguable
whether an impropriety standard is substantially different
from a 'Just cause" standard for termination-a concept directly at odds with the concept of employment at-will. 190
In this sense, interference claims in the employment setting bear a close resemblance to breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, which some courts have held exists in at-will employment relationships. As Professor J. Wilson Parker has defined it, the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is "a duty imposed by law that requires each party to
respect the rights of the other to receive the benefits of the contract and to avoid conscious injury to the other party."19 1 Although the majority of courts have refused to recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts, 192 some courts have recognized the claim as yet another exception to the at-will doctrine.' 93
188. Id. Interestingly, the Massachusetts Appeals Court did not confront
the plaintiffs argument head on. Instead, its rejection of the argument was
based on stare decisis grounds. See id.
189. Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708, 709 (Ala. 1978).
190. See Clement, 663 N.E.2d at 1236 n.6 (noting that "what is at stake is
the risk of converting the existing rule regarding at-will employees into a rule
requiring just cause for terminating such employees").
191. J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 360
(1995) (emphasis added).
192. See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at
Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443,
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One of the broader formulations of the covenant of good

194
faith and fair dealing is found in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,

a case from New Hampshire, in which the court held that a discharge "which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic system
or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
contract." 195 Under such a broad reading, there is little to distinguish between a discharge in breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and a wrongful interference with one's
business relations. There is also little distinction between such
and the abola rule, which focuses so heavily on state of mind,
196
ishment of the employment at-will doctrine.
Indeed, it is precisely because of the vagueness inherent in
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that some
courts have chosen not to recognize it in the employment setting. 197 In this sense, it shares a close kinship with the interference torts, which are designed to address behavior that, in
the words of the Second Restatement, a jury might find inconsistent with "its common feel for the state of community mores."19 8 Aside from concerns over how the impropriety standard
is to be applied in a given situation, the imposition of vicarious
liability in interference claims has the two-fold effect of imposing liability where, by definition, none can be imposed and eviscerating the at-will doctrine. Although the employment at-will
doctrine has seen its strength diminished in recent years, if it
is to be gutted in this fashion, the decision should come from
state or federal legislatures, not from the courts.' 99
1494 (1993).
193. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251,
1255-56 (Mass. 1977).
194. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
195. Id. at 551.
196. See Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1836-37
(1980) ("By implying a duty to terminate only in good faith, courts can provide
a private remedy for wrongful discharge to replace the at will rule."), cited in
Parker, supra note 191, at 360 n.41.
197. See, e.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987)
(stating that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is overly broad and is inapplicable to employment at-will contracts).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. 1 (1977).
199. This Article intentionally steers clear of entering the ongoing debate
as to the desirability of abolishing the employment at-will doctrine. For arguments on both sides of the issue, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, in LABOR LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET 3, 9-11 (Rich-
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III. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
WHITE MEAT CLAIMS: DEFAMATION
A. THE REFERENCE GRIDLOCK

In addition to providing a possible alternative to certain
red meat claims, interference claims may provide an alternative to one of the more common white meat claims-defamation. Defamation, in the employment context, may be either a
primary or a secondary cause of action.
One of the most common situations in which defamation is
the primary cause of action is in the case of a negative employment reference. The current dilemma surrounding employee
references is one of the more widely discussed areas of employment law. 2°° As it is usually stated, the problem is simple:
employers need reliable information concerning prospective
and current employees in order to hire qualified employees and
to avoid liability for negligent hiring and negligent retention
lawsuits. 20 1 Increasingly, however, employers are thwarted in
their attempts to obtain such information because of the reluctance of other employers to provide any information about a
current or former employee, aside from the employee's name,
position, and dates of employment. 2 2 Many companies have
ard A. Epstein & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985) (arguing that at-will employment is
fair to both employers and employees); McGinley, supra note 192, at 1447 (arguing for the creation by Congress of a consistent national employment discharge policy to replace "the current patchwork of civil rights laws regulating
workplace discharge"); Cornelius J. Peck, PenetratingDoctrinal Camouflage:
Understandingthe Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 719, 772-73 (1991) (arguing that courts should give explicit recognition
to a rule requiring just cause for termination of employment).
200. See generally Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 4, at 123 (arguing that
employers are overly concerned about defamation actions based on employment references); 0. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitatingthe Flow of
Truthful Personnel Information: Some Needed Change in the Standard Required to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to Defame, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 305
(1988) (arguing that the current standard encourages "unwinnable defamation
claims"); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence"and a Proposalfor Reform, 13 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 45 (1995) (proposing reforms in the law of employment references);
J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulationof Employment Reference Practices,65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115 (1998) (arguing that, although current law on negative references is a good balance, "modest" regulatory reforms should be considered).
201. See generally D. Scott Landry & Randy Hoffman, Walking the Fine
Line on Employee Job Reference Information, 43 LA. B.J. 457, 457 (1996) (discussing the dilemma).
202. See id.
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adopted this "name, rank, and serial number" approach out of
fear of the perceived rise in defamation lawsuits based on references that go beyond such generic information. 2 3 These conflicting desires on the part of employers-the desire to obtain
reliable information and the desire to avoid being sued for providing information-has resulted in a type of reference
gridlock, which prevents the free flow of information necessary
for good employees to obtain jobs and employers to hire them.
In an effort to end the gridlock, at least twenty-seven
states have adopted laws which provide some type of statutory
immunity for employers who are willing to run the feared liti2°4
gation gauntlet and provide references to another employer.
Most of the states that have adopted such statutes have done so
within the past four years. 20 5 The various statutes employ different methods in their protective schemes, but most share the
same basic characteristics. Nearly all of the statutes provide
employers with a qualified privilege, protecting them from liability resulting from the forwarding of a reference. 20 6 Most establish that this qualified immunity may be lost upon a showing of malice, of either the actual or common law variety,
depending upon the statute in question. 20 7 Finally, the major203. Id.
204. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-1361 (West Supp. 1999); CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 2000); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-2-114 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 708 (1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4 (1999); IDAHO
CODE § 44-201 (1997); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 1999);
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a (Supp. 1998);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 598 (West Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-423 (Lexis
1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-12-1 (Lexis Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02-18 (Lexis Supp. 1999);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71 (Anderson Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 61 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-6.4-1 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (West Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 60-4-12 (Lexis Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (1999); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487 (West Supp. 1997);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113 (Lexis 1999).
205. See Julie Forster, 25 States Adopt "Good Faith"Job Reference Laws to
Shield Businesses From Liability, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, July 2, 1996, at 1,
available in 1996 WL 363324.
206. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1.
207. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme
Court defined a statement made with "actual malice" as one being made "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not." Id. at 280. Common law malice is a more amorphous concept usually
synonymous with spite or ill will. See Reed & Henkel, supra note 200, at 317.
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ity of these new reference statutes extend immunity only if the
employer is responding to a request for a reference. 20 8 Under
the majority of the statutes, then, it is clear that the enacting
legislatures have made a decision that employers who take it
upon themselves to volunteer information to other employers
as
are not deserving of the same form of statutory immunity
20 9
are those who simply respond to requests for information.
Probably the most common claim stemming from the providing of a reference is defamation. 210 Indeed, most of the legislatures that have enacted reference statutes seem to have had
this tort in mind as the principal evil to be addressed. The new
reference statutes are primarily concerned with preventing the
dissemination of false information-an essential element of a
defamation claim. 211 However, a negative reference may just as
easily prompt an interference claim. The classic employee reference case is also the classic interference-with-businessrelations case: both involve two parties to a prospective relationship (the employee and the prospective employer) and action by a third party (the current or former employer) that interferes with that relationship.
Numerous courts have commented on the similarity between the defamation and interference causes of action. 2 12 At
least one court has gone so far as to suggest that a communication that would be privileged under defamation law would be
considered proper or justified under interference law. 2 13 Typically, both claims involve damaging statements made to another individual, and both employ the somewhat murky concept
of privilege as a defense. 214 Given the similarity between the
torts, it is not surprising that resourceful plaintiffs' attorneys
occasionally attach an interference claim in place of, or in addiSee, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (adopting common law malice standard);
IDAHO CODE § 44-201(2) (adopting actual malice standard).
208. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160.

209. See, e.g., id.
210. See generally Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 4.
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (1977).
212. See, e.g., Taylor v. International Union of Electronic, Elec., Salaried,
Mach. & Furniture Workers, 968 P.2d 685, 692 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that plaintiffs tortious interference action was in reality a defamation
action); Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 103 (Va. 1985) (en banc) (noting
that the defense of privilege or justification in tortious interference is similar
but not identical to the defense of qualified privilege in defamation law).
213. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Wordtronics, Corp., 561 A.2d 694, 697 (N.J. Super. 1989).
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595(1) (1977).

20001

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE

tion to, a defamation claim when a negative reference is involved. 215 As such, tortious interference may sometimes be a
possible6 alternative to the more conventional defamation
21
claim.
In some cases, an interference claim may actually be a better choice for an employee who has been harmed by a negative
reference. Under defamation law, falsity is an element of the
prima facie case. 21 7 This is not necessarily so in a tortious interference claim. Although the element of falsity is missing
from the prima facie requirements of an interference claim, the
Second Restatement provides that the providing of truthful information is not actionable. 218 Although the majority of courts
have chosen to follow the Second Restatement's rule, not all
courts have followed suit. In recent years, an interesting split
of authority has resulted as to whether a statement that causes
economic harm to a plaintiff may still be actionable under an
interference theory, even if it is completely true.2 19 Despite the
number of opinions dealing with the issue, no consistent theory
has emerged in support of either position. Nevertheless, for
those plaintiffs in states where truth is not recognized as a defense, the tort of intentional interference emerges as a potentially strong fallback position to a failed defamation claim.
1. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 772
Under the Second Restatement approach, the question of
whether an interference is improper normally involves a balancing of numerous amorphous and malleable factors, including motive, the relationship between the parties, and societal
interests. 220 The Second Restatement also provides a defense of
215. See Nowik v. Mazda Motors, 523 So. 2d 769, 770-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988); Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Kan. 1986); Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'l Med., 665 A.2d 297, 313 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995);
Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 621-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 554, 564 n.25 (W. Va. 1997).
216. See Taylor, 968 P.2d at 686 (involving an unsuccessful attempt by
plaintiff to bring an interference claim where a defamation claim was barred
by the statute of limitations); Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 313-19 (involving alternate
claims of interference and defamation based upon negative reference); Dwyer
v. Sabine Mining Co., 890 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (allowing an
interference claim where a defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations).
217.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).

218. See id. § 772(a).
219. See infra notes 261-83.
220. See supra notes 38, 49-53 and accompanying text.
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truth that renders all of these concerns moot. Section 772 provides the following:
One who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract
or not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another
does not interfere improperly with the other's contractual relation, by
giving the third person
(a) truthful information, or
22
(b) honest advice within the scope of a request for the advice. '

Perhaps the first feature that strikes the reader of section 772
is the section's title---"Advice as Proper or Improper Interference." Although subsection (b) speaks to requested advice, subsection (a) contains no requirement that the "truthful information" provided be requested or even that it be advice. As such,
the inclusion of unrequested, truthful information as a defense
within a section ostensibly devoted to "advice" is somewhat
misleading. 222 By its terms then, the defense provided in subsection (b) is also much narrower than that provided in subsection (a).
a. Honest Advice
What subsection (b) gives with one hand, it takes away
with the other. A reasonable interpretation of the rule is that
"[i]t is not necessary that the advice given be truthful or even
reasonable, only that it be given in good faith." 223 By affording
a defense for the giving of "advice," subsection (b) clearly seems
to contemplate the providing of opinion; however, the provider
of such advice has a defense only if the advice was honestly
given in response to a request for advice. 22 4 That the provider
is answering a request for advice is the scenario that most of
225
the newly-enacted reference statutes seem to contemplate.
Although the agent-principal scenario may be the most
common situation in which subsection (b) applies, nothing
within the language of subsection (b) or the comments thereto
restrict it to such cases. The comments state that "the lawyer,
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1977).
222. Indeed, of the five comments to section 772, only one mentions truthful information. The first comment is an explanatory note and three of the
five discuss honest advice within the scope of a request for advice. See id.
cmts. a-e.
223. Cabanas v. Gloodt Assocs., 942 F. Supp. 1295, 1307 (E.D. Cal. 1996),
affd, 141 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1998).
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 cmt. c (1977).
225. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of most statutes that the employer be responding to a request).
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the doctor, the clergyman, the banker, the investment, marriage or other counselor, and the efficiency expert need this
protection for the performance of their tasks."226 However, the
comments also make clear that the rule "protects the amateur
as well as the professional adviser," so long as the amateur
satisfies the rule's requirements. 227 Therefore, subsection (b)
may have direct application to the garden variety reference
claim. If, for example, the prospective employer asks the "efficiency expert" of a former or current employer point blank,
"should I hire this individual?" the rule would protect any honest answer given.
The tendency of courts to interpret subsection (b) narrowly,
however, limits the overall usefulness of the rule. Most courts
import a subjective good faith requirement into the assessment
of the overall honesty of a response. In other words, a defendant's advice cannot be "honest" if based on an illegitimate ulterior motive. 228 Therefore, even if the "efficiency expert," for
example, honestly believes that an employee should be terminated and advises her employer accordingly, the expert may
still be liable if the expert's evaluation is not based on job efficiency or performance, but instead is based solely on some ulterior motive. 229 By that same reasoning, an employer who responds to a prospective employer's request for advice about a
prospective employee could theoretically be liable if she is motivated by a desire to "get" the former employee, even if the
opinion as to the employee's negative characteristic is honestly
held.
The issue becomes more confusing when the advice-giver
has mixed motives. Under subsection (b), it is immaterial that
the advice-giver, besides his legitimate reasons for firings, also
dislikes the person whom he fired or also profits by the advice,
so long as the advice was honest, requested, and within the
scope of the request.230 Several courts have held that the
privilege for requested advice remains intact despite the exis226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 cmt. c (1977).
227. Id.
228. See Cabanas,942 F. Supp. at 1297, 1307; Haupt v. International Harvester Co., 582 F. Supp. 545, 550 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Scussel v. Balter, 386 So. 2d
1227, 1228 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Halverson v. Murzynski, 487 S.E.2d 19,
21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
229. See Haupt, 582 F. Supp. at 550.
230.

See RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 cmt. c (1977); Trepanier

v. Getting Organized, Inc., 583 A.2d 583, 589 (Vt. 1990) (citing Riblet Tramway Co. v. Erickson Assocs., 665 F. Supp. 81, 87-88 (D.N.H. 1987)).
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tence of mixed motives. 231 Conversely, if the advisor acts solely
for his own interests, the interference is improper. 232 However,
in some cases, this may be a fine hair to split. In Halverson v.
Murzynski,2 33 a case from Georgia, the court seemed to reject
the notion that advice, based upon discriminatory animus,
could fall within the honest advice exception. 234 In Halverson,
an efficiency expert had advised the company for which he
worked to fire one of its employees, allegedly because of her religious views. 235 The efficiency firm unsuccessfully argued that
it had been hired to evaluate the efficiency and performance of
personnel and that its recommendation was based on the employee's behavior. 236 The court held that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the firm had induced the employer to
terminate the employee, not because of her performance, but
because of her religious views. 237 According to the court, the
the employer to
defendant did not have a privilege to induce
238
terminate the employee on such grounds.
Additionally, the language of subsection (b) itself may be a
substantial limitation on an employer's ability to provide an
opinion. When read in context, the rule probably only covers
the giving of actual "advice," rather than the giving of more
generalized opinions. Because the "honest advice" must be
within the scope of a request, stray, unrequested statements or
and the provider may be held
opinions may not be protected,
239
liable if she volunteers them.

231. See Trepanier, 583 A.2d at 589 (citing Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v.
Davis, 687 F.2d 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1982)).
232. See id.
233. 487 S.E.2d 19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
234. See id. at 21. The mere fact that the provider of advice also happens
to benefit because the principal takes the advice should not, by itself, make
the advice improper. See Welch v. Bancorp Management Servs., 675 P.2d 172,
178-79 (Or. 1983).
235. See Halverson, 487 S.E.2d at 19.
236. See id. at 21.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 cmt. d (1977) (noting that
the scope of a request is a question of fact and may be limited to a specific
phase or problem); see also Estate of Braude v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 99,
114 (1996) (stating that no tort would have occurred had the officials merely
provided potential employers with honest information about plaintiffs termination instead of volunteering that plaintiff had been blacklisted and should
not be considered for employment).
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b. Truth
Under subsection (a), an individual does not have to await
a request for information-she is free to volunteer whatever information she chooses, relevant or irrelevant, so long as it is
truthful. 240 Thus, taken literally, subsection (a) provides an absolute defense for the providing of truthful information. In
light of the fact that many employers provide little more than
the "name, rank, and serial number" of a current or former employee when asked for a reference, it will be only the most daring of employers who will choose to volunteer information about
a former employee absent a request. 24 1 However, because subsection (a) applies to either situation, it provides a measure of
assurance to cautious and daring employers alike.
The comments to section 772 state that the section is a
special application of the general balancing test contained in
section 767 for determining whether an interference is improper.242 But because truth renders any consideration of motive, relations between the parties, or societal interest moot,
section 767 only has application in the case of requested advice.
If an individual volunteers truthful information without such a
request, the balancing test of section 767 never enters into the
equation. Thus, truth emerges as the silver bullet in tortious
interference cases-no matter how malicious the actor's conduct, how substantial the other party's interest, or how much
society may abhor the actions of the interferor, so long as the
statements are true, there can be no liability.243 Truth, like
love, conquers all.
Interestingly, the authors of the Second Restatement offered no explanation as to why truth should be an absolute defense, overriding all other concerns. They seemed fairly certain
that their position was unassailable, however, noting matter-offactly that "[there is of course no liability for interference with
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772(a) (1977).
241. Landry & Hoffman, supra note 201, at 457. See generally Frances A.
McMorris, Some Firms Less Guarded in Sharing Job References, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, July 15, 1996, at E4 (citing a survey by the Society for Human Resource Management finding that 63% of personnel managers refused to provide reference information about former employees to prospective employers).
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 cmt. a (1977).
243. See, e.g., Arntz Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 895 (1996) (stating that "a true representation does not become wrongful just because the defendant is motivated by a black desire to
hurt plaintiffs business").
240.
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a contract or with a prospective contractual relation on the part
2
of one who merely gives truthful information to another." "
Despite the authors' confidence that such a rule would "of
course" be unquestioned, several courts have flatly rejected the
notion that truth should be an absolute defense in tortious interference cases. 245 Like the Second Restatement authors, however, few courts have even attempted to formulate a theory as
to why truth should or should not be an absolute defense to an
interference claim.
One of the most recent cases to address the applicability of
section 772 is Tiernan v. Charleston Area Medical Center,
Inc.246 In Tiernan, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided to adopt section 772(a) in a case involving a claim
for tortious interference with a business relationship. 247 Tiernan presents a set of facts that most defense attorneys would
consider unthinkable. The plaintiff had been terminated from
her job at a local medical center. 248 Shortly after losing her job,
the plaintiff began working as a union organizer and after several months, took a part-time job with a private nursing
home. 249 The medical center soon thereafter contacted the
nursing home and informed it that the plaintiff had been employed as a union organizer.2 50 Upon learning this information,
the nursing home terminated plaintiffs employment. 25 1 Rather
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 cmt. b (1977).
245. See Carman v. Entner, No. 13978, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 387, at *23
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1994); Collincini v. Honeywell, Inc., 601 A.2d 292, 295
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Pratt v. Prodata Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1994); see
also Stonestreet Marketing Servs., Inc. v. Chicago Custom Engraving, Inc.,
Apr. 26, 1994)
No. 93 C 1785, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5548, at *16 n.2 (N.D. Ill.
(stating that truthful information only provides a defendant with a qualified
or conditional privilege); C.N.C. Chem. Corp. v. Pennwalt Corp., 690 F. Supp.
139, 143 (D.R.I. 1988) (stating that the providing of truthful information is not
an absolute defense); Puente v. Dillard's Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 07-98-0013-CV,
1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 7627, at *17 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1998) (noting that
even the providing of truthful information may constitute tortious interference).
246. 506 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1998).
247. See id. at 593.
248. See id. at 581.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. The exact relationship between the hospital and the nursing
home was disputed between the parties. The plaintiff asserted that the nursing home operated under a management agreement with and was controlled
by the hospital. See id. at 592 n.21. The trial court ultimately concluded that
the hospital and the nursing home were actually synonymous. See id.
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than bringing a potentially strong discrimination claim based
on federal labor law, the plaintiff instead alleged that the medical center had tortiously interfered with her business relationship with the nursing home.
The applicability of section 772(a) was an issue of first impression in West Virginia. 252 Because the information provided
by the plaintiffs former employer was neither advice, nor requested, section 772(b) was not at issue.253 After noting that
courts adopting the Second Restatement's position that truth is
an absolute defense to a charge of tortious interference had
failed to articulate their basis for so doing,254 the court proceeded to do just the same. Nowhere within the majority opinion is there any explanation, either on constitutional or public
policy grounds, as to the reasons behind its adoption of section
772(a). That task was left to the concurring judge. Noting the
symmetry of adopting the position that truth could be an absolute defense in both defamation and tortious interference
with business relations claims, the concurrence articulated the
views of employers everywhere who are wary of providing employment references for fear of exposing themselves to potential
lawsuits. 255 By failing to adopt the position that truth could be
an absolute defense,
every facet of our lives would be endangered: workers whose lives depend on the level of safety in workplaces would be placed at risk by
newly hired co-workers whose background and safety record could no
longer be checked; children in day care, the sick, the aged and infirm
would not be protected from caretakers who have a history of molesting or preying upon these defenseless groups; small business owners, whose entire livelihood is invested, sometimes for generations,
could be financially ruined, and their employees left jobless, by the
actions of one employee whose background could not be effectively
questioned or verified. Indeed, every citizen who depends upon police
officers, firefighters, or emergency personnel has a 6stake in the pursuit of truth in the hiring and employment processY

A sharply worded dissent attacked the majority for "dealing in absolutes. '2 57 According to the dissent, creating an absolute defense for the providing of truthful information,
258
whether requested or not, would "license malicious conduct."
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See id. at 592.
See id. at 593.
See id.
See id. at 603 (McCuskey, J., concurring).
Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 607 (Workman, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Although recognizing that a privilege should, in most circumstances, attach for the providing of truthful information, the
dissent argued that "such conduct should under some limited
circumstances be actionable if there is malicious intent to do
substantial economic harm." 59 Therefore, the dissent argued
for a narrower, case-by-case analysis whenever an individual
260
employer supplied truthful, unrequested information.
B. RECOGNIZING TRUTH AS A DEFENSE TO AN INTERFERENCE
CLAIM
Although the majority opinion in Tiernan failed to provide
any true insight as to why truth should be a defense to a claim
of tortious interference, it is a model of clarity compared to
some of the other opinions on the subject. Most courts holding
that truth may be a defense do so with little more than a passing reference to the fact that this is how the Second Restatement says things should be.26 1 Those cases rejecting the rule
262
also do so with little comment.
The lack of analysis underlying these cases is disturbing
for at least two reasons. First, the question of whether truth
should be an absolute defense raises some rather obvious constitutional issues. 263 For example, there are well-established
constitutional limitations on state law defamation claims, a tort
259. Id. at 607-08 (Workman, J., dissenting).
260. See id. at 607. A federal district court in Rhode Island has expressed
a similar view: "The general rule that communicating truthful information
does not constitute 'improper' interference should not be viewed as absolute.
Its applicability depends upon the circumstances." C.N.C. Chem. Corp. v.
Pennwalt Corp., 690 F. Supp. 139, 143 (D.R.I. 1988); see also Stonestreet Marketing Servs., Inc. v. Chicago Custom Engraving, Inc., No. 93-C1785, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5548, at *16 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 1994) ("[W]e believe that
the truthful nature of the communications simply entitles Defendants to a
qualified or conditional privilege which is a defense unless the jury concludes
Defendants abused the privilege or took action motivated by desires other
than the interest protected by the privilege.").
261. See, e.g., Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 1089, 1092
(11th Cir. 1994) ("This common sense rule is set forth at § 772 of the Restatement (Second)of Torts .

").

262. See, e.g., Collincini v. Honeywell, Inc., 601 A.2d 292, 296 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) ("Honeywell's suggested fourteenth point is a misstatement of the
law, and as such was not relevant. Truth is an absolute defense to defamation; it is not a defense to intentional interference with contractual relations.").
263. For a constitutionally-based argument that truth should be a defense
to a claim of interference, see generally Robert L. Tucker, "And the Truth
Shall Make You Free: Truth as a FirstAmendment Defense in Tortious Interference with ContractCases, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 709 (1997).
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which is closely related to interference actions. As Professor
David Anderson has detailed, the interference torts almost cry
out for some inquiry into the free speech implications of imposing liability for truthful, yet damaging statements. 264 Yet,
no court or legislature has fully addressed this issue.
Judicial reluctance to inquire into the implications of imposing liability for truthful but damaging statements may simply reflect the overall unwillingness of courts to confront the
free-speech implications of torts related to speech. 265 The constitutional limitations on defamation are, by now, well established. Although tortious interference is not identical in nature
to defamation, the parallels are such that one would suppose
that a court confronting the question of whether truth is a defense would at least feel compelled to acknowledge the potential implication of its decision. 266 Instead, scarcely a hint of
such concern exists in opinions on the subject.
The line of cases addressing truth as a defense in tortious
interference cases is disturbing for a second reason. The opinions reflect the overall lack of doctrinal clarity in the interference torts, and the tendency for such claims to be resolved less
on clear principles than on vague concepts of right and wrong.
When one reads the facts of a case addressing the issue of truth
as a defense, it is not difficult to predict how the court will ultimately rule. Where a defendant simply has acted as a good
citizen or was doing his job, courts tend to recognize truth as a
defense to an interference claim more readily than they do
when a defendant has behaved in a more questionable fash267
ion.

264. See generally David A. Anderson, Symposium: Torts, Speech, and Contracts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (1997).

265. See id. at 1500.
266. Professor Anderson has argued that truthful persuasion which results
in an interference with an existing contract or a prospective contractual relation should not be actionable as a matter of tort law and suggests that a contrary rule might run afoul of the First Amendment. See id. at 1500, 1536.
267. Compare Worldwide Primates, Inc., v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 1089, 1092
(I1th Cir. 1994) (citing Second Restatement section 772 and holding that truth
is a defense to an interference claim where the defendant wrote a truthful letter to the director of a zoo informing the zoo about the plaintiffs documented
history of mistreatment of animals); and In re American Continental/Lincoln
Sav. & Loan, 884 F. Supp. 1388, 1396 n.12 (D. Ariz. 1995), affd, 102 F.3d 1524
(9th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) (holding that truth
is a defense to an interference claim where the plaintiff sued a law firm and its
attorneys for statements made to the press, in court documents, and in court);
and Francis v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 361, 364 n.4 (Ct. App.
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Section 772 provides an easy justification for a court to find
for or against a particular defendant based on the perceived
propriety of his actions. For example, it is much easier to
swallow the notion that truth is an absolute defense to an interference claim where the defendant's truthful statements
helped expose welfare fraud268 or helped prevent the mistreatment of animals by ruthless handlers. 2 9 It is a more bitter pill
to swallow where the defendant has engaged in behavior upon
which society frowns. Interestingly, several of the cases to reject the argument that truth is a defense to an interference
claim do so in the context of a former employer providing unrequested, truthful information to an employee's current employer, which damages the employee's relationship with that
employer.270 If the former employer is not seeking to protect its
own interest through providing such information, somehow
such action seems, on a gut level, improper. 27 1 Indeed, under
1992) (citing Second Restatement section 772 and holding that truth is a defense to a claim of interference with contractual relations and interference
with prospective economic advantage in a case in which the defendant published an accurate credit report which had an adverse impact upon the plaintiff); and C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Wordtronics Corp., 561 A.2d 694, 697 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1989) (citing Second Restatement section 772 and holding that it is not improper for a business to provide truthful information about a competitor to
third persons); and Petersen v. Patzke, No. 93-3158-FT, 1994 WL 387142, at
*1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 26, 1994) (holding that truth is an absolute defense to a
claim of tortious interference in a case in which defendants notified local
authorities that plaintiff was not entitled to welfare benefits she had been receiving), with Carman v. Entner, No. 13978, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 387, at
*23 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1994) (holding that "where there is no need to interfere with a contract to protect a genuine legal right, even truthful statements,
calculated to interfere with the contract, are actionable," in a case involving
threats against the plaintiff); and Collincini, 601 A.2d at 295 (rejecting the
argument that truth is a defense to plaintiffs interference claim based upon
defendant-employer's notification of plaintiff's new employer that plaintiff was
interfering with defendant's existing contracts); and Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885
P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1994) (rejecting the Second Restatement's approach toward truth as a defense where an employer contacted plaintiffs new employer
and informed the new employer that the employee had previously signed a
noncompete covenant).
268. See Petersen, 1994 WL 387142, at *1.
269. See Worldwide Primates,Inc., 26 F.3d at 1092.
270. See Pratt,885 P.2d at 790; Collincini, 601 A.2d at 295. But see Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 592-93 (W. Va. 1998)
(holding in such a case that truth is a defense).
271. See Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 624 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980). Stated more eloquently:
If our analysis of [the defendant's] actions is more critical in connection with appellant's claim of improper interference with his prospective employment relationship with Turbo than it was in connection
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section 767, the interests sought to be advanced by the actor is
one factor to be considered in the determination of the propriety of an act.272 Yet, section 772's pronouncement that truthful
statements are not actionable eliminates any consideration of
such interests.
Section 772(a)'s declaration that truth is an absolute defense is puzzling in that it is completely at odds with the nature
of the tort of interference. Under the Second Restatement,
judging the propriety of a defendant's conduct requires a balancing of the amorphous concepts outlined in section 767.273
Under the balancing-of-factors approach, one of the factors to
be considered in assessing whether an interference is improper
is the actor's motive. 274 In the comments, the authors note that
it "may become very important to ascertain whether the actor
was motivated, in whole or in part, by a desire to interfere with
the other's contractual relations. If this was the sole motive the
interference is almost certain to be held improper.2 75 Yet, under section 772(a), even if the actor's sole motive was to interfere with or actually destroy another's contractual relations, if
the statements constituting the interference are true, they can
never be held improper. The comment notes that "[a] motive to
injure another or to vent one's ill will on him serves no socially
useful purpose.2 7 6 Yet, by allowing truth as an absolute defense, societal concerns over motive are meaningless. The
venting of ill will and the desire to ruin another are perfectly
proper. Such an approach appears to be inherently at odds
with a tort that is seemingly fixated on propriety.
Reconsider the case of Tiernan v. CharlestonArea Medical
Center Inc., in which a former employer contacted the employee's new employer and informed it that the employee was a
union organizer. 277 It would hardly be a great leap to conclude
with appellant's claim of wrongful discharge from SP-AD, this results
from our conviction that a manager's pursuit of a former employee
and interference with the employee's employment opportunities at
another company constitutes a far greater infringement upon the employees right to earn a living than does the manager's discharge of
the employee from the manager's own company.
Id.
272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(d) cmt. f (1977).

273. See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
274. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(b) (1977).
275. Id. cmt. d (emphasis added).
276. Id.
277. 506 S.E.2d 578, 581 (W. Va. 1998); see also supra text accompanying
notes 246-60.
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that the former employer's sole motive was to injure the employee or to vent the medical center's ill will toward the employee. Indeed, such a conclusion seems plausible given that
the employee's decision to criticize the medical center's policies
publicly led to her firing.278 Admittedly, the facts of the case
are susceptible to other interpretations that do not confer such
malice upon the defendant. But if this interpretation is accurate, then by adopting section 772, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals sanctioned behavior that the authors of the
Second Restatement considered in section 767 to have "no socially useful purpose" and that should "almost certain[ly] ... be
held improper. '2 79 Yet, strangely, this is the exact result the
authors called for in section 772.
This grant of absolute immunity is somewhat in conflict
with another section of the Second Restatement that pertains to
immunity from defamation. Under the Second Restatement
section 595, an important factor for determining whether a
publication is privileged for purposes of defamation is whether
the publication was made in response to a request rather than
simply being volunteered by the publisher.28 0 If the information was volunteered, it cuts against extending the privilege to
the publisher. As mentioned, this is also the approach followed
by the majority of reference statutes. 28 1 Similarly, section
772(b) affords a defense only where the providing of honest advice was requested. 28 2 In contrast, section 772(a) makes no disthe truthful information was retinction between whether
283
quested or volunteered.

278. See Tiernan, 506 S.E.2d at 581. However, it is also entirely possible
that the former employer's motivation was somewhat less nefarious. Although
the exact relationship between the former employer and the new employer was
somewhat unclear, there was evidence to suggest that the new employer was
actually an alter ego of the former employer. See id. at 592. Thus, the former
employer may have been somewhat justified in informing its alter ego of its
employee's background. Under section 767(g) the relations between the parties are one factor to consider in assessing the propriety of the interference,
and in this instance it is a factor that seems to cut in the former employer's
favor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(g) (1977). If the two employers were actually one and the same, it hardly seems improper for the entity to keep itself informed as to the union activity of its employees, provided
that such information gathering is not used in a discriminatory fashion.
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 767 cmt. d (1977).
280.

See id. § 595(2)(a).

281. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 221-22, 240-45 and accompanying text.
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C. THE EFFECT OF SECTION 772 ON THE FLOW OF REFERENCES
None of the foregoing should be read to imply that truth
should not be a valid defense to a claim of tortious interference.
Sound public policy and constitutional arguments exist for the
position that truth should be an absolute defense, despite the
courts' failure to articulate a theory in support of the view. 28 4
What is of concern about section 772 is that it is at odds with
what little explicit justification the authors of the Second Restatement have put forth for the existence of the tort of interference with contractual relations or interference with prospective contractual relations.
In light of the substantial
uncertainty that exists by the very nature of the tort, section
772 simply adds fuel to the fire.
As plaintiffs' attorneys begin to assert interference claims
with more frequency, it is possible that a clear majority rule
with an underlying rationale will develop regarding the issue of
truth as a defense. At present, cases such as Tiernan remain
the exception. Therefore, employers should not place a great
deal of reliance on Tiernan for the principle that an employer is
free to interfere with an employer's prospective employment
relationship so long as the employer does so truthfully.
Still, Tiernan may be helpful in supporting the position
that truth should be recognized as a defense to an interference
claim in order to narrow the gap in the law concerning references. Employee reference laws notwithstanding, if truth cannot be a defense, there will be yet another disincentive to employers providing references concerning their employees. Such
a result would exacerbate the problems inherent in the status
quo, which harms all sides of the reference equation.
CONCLUSION
Although lesser known than some of the other collateral
torts, tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations may be a highly effective cause of action for plaintiffs in the employment setting.
With their uncertain standards and uncertain premises, the interference torts are attractive to plaintiffs seeking to escape the
284. See, e.g., Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578,
603-07 (W. Va. 1998) (McCuskey, J., concurring) (reciting the advantages of

such a rule on public policy grounds); Anderson, supra note 264, at 1536 (noting the First Amendment implications of recognizing truth as a defense to interference claims).
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restrictions of traditional red and white meat claims. Through
their potential to expose both employers and individual employees to liability based on a standard as uncertain as "impropriety," tortious interference claims in the workplace represent
a significant loophole in the employment at-will doctrine. At
least in some jurisdictions, interference claims also provide a
method of avoiding the well-established principles of defamation law. Unfortunately, because of confusion in the Second
Restatement and lack of consistent case law, employers and
employees have little upon which to rely in evaluating claims
premised upon tortious interference. Until some order is established in the judiciary's resolution of such claims, the interference torts will continue to be a difficult meal to digest for
employment attorneys.

